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Abstract
* 
Few would dispute that sovereign defaults entail significant economic costs, 
including, most notably, important output losses. However, most of the evidence 
supporting this conventional wisdom, based on annual observations, suffers from 
serious measurement and identification problems. To address these drawbacks, 
we examine the impact of default on growth by looking at quarterly data for 
emerging economies. We find that, contrary to what is typically assumed, output 
contractions precede defaults. Moreover, we find that the trough of the 
contraction coincides with the quarter of default, and that output starts to grow 
thereafter, indicating that default episode seems to mark the beginning of the 
economic recovery rather than a further decline. This suggests that, whatever 
negative effects a default may have on output, those effects result from   
anticipation of a default rather than the default itself.  
                                                       
* We would like to thank Eduardo Cavallo and other participants in the December 2005 IPES pre-conference, and 
we wish to thank Mariano Alvarez for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are the 
authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Inter-American Development Bank.   4
 
“Hell, the last thing I should be doing is tell a country we should give up our claims. But there 
comes a time when you have to face reality.”    
 
“The problem historically has not been that countries have been to eager to renege on their 





As conventional wisdom has it, a sovereign’s unilateral decision to stop servicing its debt carries 
important and persistent economic costs. This is what is assumed (either explicitly or implicitly) 
by the sovereign debt literature as a government’s main incentive to honor its obligations.
2  In 
this paper, we argue that using higher-frequency data yields a starkly different message. In 
particular, we show that defaults have no significant negative impact on successive output 
growth and, if anything, mark the final stage of the crisis and the beginning of economic 
recovery. 
The empirical literature has looked at the relationship between default and GDP growth 
mainly in three ways: (i) output regressions directly controlling for default events; (ii) tests of the 
effect of (current and past) defaults on access to the international credit market (more 
specifically, borrowing costs); and (iii) tests of the effects on international trade (either due to the 
drying up of trade credit or due to the implementation of trade sanctions). In all three cases, the 
costs specifically associated with default (that is, in excess of those related to the ongoing crisis, 
or to the memory of a recent crisis) are difficult to identify. While Ozler (1993) found that 
defaults in the 1930s were associated with an increase in spreads of approximately 20 basis 
points 40 years later, more recent work found that the effect of default on spreads is short-lived 
(Ades et al., 2000; Borensztein and Panizza, 2005a). Focusing on the trade cost of defaults Rose 
(2002) found that countries that defaulted on official (Paris Club) debt trade less with defaulted 
                                                       
1 The first quote is from an unnamed financial industry official; the second comes from a memo prepared by the 
Central Banks of England and Canada. Both are taken from Blustein (2005, pp. 163 and 102). 
2 Sturzenegger (2004) finds a strong (albeit short-lived) negative contemporaneous effect on growth, and substantial 
output losses associated with defaults, a result confirmed by Borenzstein and Panizza (2005a). Both studies are 
based on annual observations.   5
countries, while Borensztein and Panizza (2005b) find that export-oriented industries tend to 
suffer more in the aftermath of a default, though the effect is transitory.
3  
However, all these are indirect costs, and growth regressions should be the main piece of 
evidence supporting the view that defaults have been costly. It is easy to see, though, how 
existing results may be misleading. Consider, for instance, two recent default episodes: Ecuador 
and Argentina. Judging from annual data, Ecuador contracted by 6 percent in 1999 (the default 
year), and Argentina’s output declined by 12 percent in 2002 (the official date of the Argentinean 
default was December 2001). However, a closer look at the data reveals a starkly different 
picture. Once the quarterly evolution of GDP is taken into account, the default event appears to 
coincide not with the period of more pronounced contraction but rather with the beginning of the 
recovery (Figure 1). Quarterly and annual data yield different messages because GDP is an 
average, and high-frequency shocks tend to spill over to the subsequent period when output is 
reported at a lower frequency. Thus, the sharp GDP contraction in Argentina in late 2001 is 
largely registered as an output decline in 2002, despite the fact that the economy started to grow 
early that year. As the figure shows, the same could be said for the large defaults of the 1990s, 
such as those by Indonesia, Russia, Ukraine and Uruguay (indeed, recovery was already 
underway in the latter at the time of default).   
Related with the previous point, a key reason why a look at quarterly data is in order is 
that default, rather than a strategic decision to withhold the surplus of the bonanza, as painted in 
the traditional sovereign debt literature (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), tends to reflect 
financial constraints in the midst of economic crises. It is easy to see how this poses a serious 
identification problem, namely, disentangling the effect of the default decision from that of the 
crisis per se on economic performance—and how one could spuriously attribute the peak of the 
crisis to the default event, capturing the incidence of financial distress on the decision to default, 
rather than the impact of default on financial and economic performance. Although the use of 
higher-frequency data does not fully solve this problem, it help to provide a more accurate 
picture. In particular, it shows more clearly the timing of the default in the context of the 
evolving crisis and sheds light on the timing of the events. 
                                                       
3 Borensztein and Panizza (2005a) explore a fourth channel: the effect of defaults on the propensity to suffer a 
banking crises (presumably due to the fiscal exposure of the banking sector). They find that defaults do not present a 
systematic leading pattern (although this does not deny that expectations of a debt default could trigger a bank run).    6
With this in mind, in this paper we conduct a simple exercise: We replicate the standard 
tests of the effect of default on growth and output using quarterly data for emerging economies. 
The use of quarterly data allows us to date the default properly, to capture the evolution of output 
more accurately, and to control for slowly moving fundamentals to better isolate the effect of 
default.  
We restrict our attention to a particular type of default, namely, default on debt with 
private international investors. For this reason, we focus on emerging economies, which by 
definition comprise globally integrated economies with a minimum volume of cross-border debt. 
The emerging class provides a reasonably homogenous group exhibiting comparable external 
vulnerability to capital account reversals (Sudden Stops) and, possibly, the highest propensity to 
suffer from default episodes.
4  
Moving from yearly to quarterly data entails properly dating the default, which poses 
non-trivial problems. Take, for instance, the recent events in Argentina. While Standard and 
Poor’s gave a selective default rating in the last quarter of 2001 after a quasi-voluntary debt 
exchange, most observers argue that a more accurate date of the default on international bonds is 
January 2002, when the default was actually announced.
5  
In this paper, we compile a quarterly database on emerging market defaults and run panel 
growth regressions controlling for crisis variables, both annual (to check consistency with 
previous results reported in the literature) and quarterly. We include several leads and lags to 
ensure that the results are not driven by dating errors. We find that, when we look at quarterly 
data, growth rates in the post-default period are never significantly lower than in normal times. 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that, contrary to what is typically assumed, the output 
contractions often attributed to defaults actually precede them. Indeed, defaults mark the 
inflection point at which output reaches its minimum and starts to recover.  
This should not be interpreted as proof that defaults in general do not matter. On the 
contrary, much in the way of a standard liquidity run, most of the financial distress that precedes 
the default decision may be due to its anticipation. However, our findings have distinct 
                                                       
4 Extending this exercise to other countries is not straightforward. There are no recent defaults by industrial 
countries, and their inclusion as a control group is questionable. On the other hand, while there are defaults on debt 
with foreign banks in non-emerging, low income economies, availability of quarterly output data is in these case 
virtually null. 
5 Importantly, Argentina had not missed a payment before that date. This example, however, shows that dating 
errors are only magnified when we look at annual data, yet another reason to go quarterly.   7
implications from a policy perspective. If defaults were costly a posteriori, the decision to default 
should weigh these costs against the fiscal effort needed to service the debt. However, once the 
default is anticipated (and its concomitant cost brought forward) by the market, the formal 
decision to stop servicing the debt entails no tradeoff and is therefore optimal (and even 
overdue).  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 presents the 
main empirical results. Finally, Section 4 discusses the implications of our findings for the 
optimal timing of default and concludes. 
 
Section 2. The Data 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a definition of our 
variables and the sources of data, and Table A2 lists all countries and periods covered in the 
analysis. 
Table 2 lists the default episodes in our sample. The tests below do not include all 23 
default episodes listed in the table because some of them occurred within a relatively short 
window and should be considered as spin-offs of the previous episode; their inclusion may bias 
the results against finding a significant default cost. For this reason, we exclude default episodes 
that happen within three years of the previous default (which leaves out the Indonesian defaults 
of 2000 and 2002). Furthermore, we only include default on private lenders and hence exclude 
the Pakistani default on Paris Club debt of 1997. As a consequence, our working sample includes 
20 default episodes. Ten of these episodes took place in the 1980s and mostly concerned 
international bank loans. The remaining 10 took place in the last 15 years and mostly involved 




Figure 2 illustrates how the evolution of GDP around default episodes varies when we move 
from annual to quarterly observations. The first panel shows GDP levels over a 6-year window 
centered on the default period for a full sample of emerging and non-emerging economies.
6 The 
X axis is defined in event time, where 0 indicates the year of the default episode, -3 indicates 
                                                       
6 Quarterly GDP levels are seasonally adjusted (excluding the default period) and normalized by the mean over the 
window.    8
three years before the episode and 3 indicates three years after the event. This shows that GDP 
starts decreasing two years before the event and keeps decreasing (albeit, at a slower rate) in the 
following three years, a picture broadly consistent with the output cost of defaults identified in 
panel growth regressions that use annual data.  
In the second panel, we repeat the exercise for our emerging market sample. As before, 
we see a clear drop in GDP in the three years before the default episode, whereas now the output 
remains stable and close to its minimum in the following three years. Again, the declining trend 
precedes the default event, but growth remains either negative or close to zero thereafter. 
The third panel replicates the exercise once more, this time for the emerging market 
sample and using quarterly data (now the X axis is measured in quarters). Now, we find a 
slightly negative trend in the three years preceding the default episode combined with a steep 
drop in the last three quarters of the pre-episode window. On the other hand, while GDP still 
falls in the quarter after the event, the trend reverses immediately thereafter to a quick and steady 
recovery to above pre-crisis levels. Thus, at least at this preliminary graphic level, going from 




Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence that the output costs of default are hard to find when 
measured using quarterly data, but does not amount to a formal test. Such a test is reported in this 
section. As before, we move gradually from the existing literature to our preferred specification. 
 
3.1 Default and Growth 
 
Table 3 estimates the cost of default using a standard growth regression based on yearly data. In 
columns 1 to 3, we take the specification adopted by Sturzenegger (2004) and Borensztein and 
Panizza (2005a) and add country fixed effects. In column 1, we capture the cost of default with a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the year in which a country defaults and zero otherwise 
(def). The regression shows the standard results: defaults are associated with a drop in growth of 
approximately 3 percentage points and the coefficient is highly significant.  Column 2 also 
includes a dummy taking a value of 1 in the year that precedes the episode (def T-1) and a 
dummy taking a value of 1 in the year that follows the episode (def T+1).  We find negative 
coefficients for both dummies, although only the lead (def T-1) is statistically significant. 
Column 3 replicates column 2, this time dropping the year of default episode, and finds identical   9
results. In columns 4 to 6, we run the same regressions without the control variables as an 
intermediate step towards our quarterly specification, which excludes controls due to data 
availability. Now def T+1 becomes statistically significant and large, indicating that growth in 
the year after default is 2 percentage points lower than in tranquil times. Other than that, the 
results are strikingly similar to the previous ones. The same applies to column 7 (where we 
replicate the specification of column 4 for the sample of column 1), and to columns 8 to 10 
(where we run similar regressions for our emerging market sample). Results are virtually 
unchanged in all cases. In sum, based on annual data, during the three-year window around 
default, growth rates appear to be significantly (and substantially) lower than average—although, 
judging from the value of the coefficients, there is no indication that the decline accelerates after 
the actual default event. 
Reassured by the robustness of the previous results to sample and specification changes, 
in Table 4 we repeat the exercise using quarterly GDP data. Column 1 includes only two 
regressors: a dummy variable taking value 1 in the default quarter and a market pressure index 
along the lines of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The coefficient of the default dummy is 
negative and very large, suggesting that at the time default materializes, (quarterly) growth is a 
hefty 2.8 percent lower than in normal times. As expected, the market pressure variable is also 
negative and statistically significant.
7 Column 2 adds dummies for the quarters that precede and 
follow the default event: unlike in the previous table, growth is now significantly lower in the 
quarter before, but not in the quarter after default. The same message is delivered when we 
include dummies for two and three periods before and after default (columns 3 and 4), and when 
we use two dummies to indicate the corresponding leads and lags (columns 5 and 6). In 
particular, growth is always significantly lower in the quarters leading to default but not in the 
quarters following default (we report the joint test of leads and lags at the bottom panel of the 
table).  
Thus, a simple comparison of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that default materializes when the 
crisis are already underway: the negative link revealed by annual data simply captures the fact 
that defaults tend to occur in the context (and often as a result) of a crisis.  
                                                       
7 Dropping this variable or including a variable measuring changes in the real exchange rate does not affect our 
results.   10
Quarterly data may be more sensitive to (autocorrelated) measurement error that tends to 
be corrected over time. However, the results are unaltered when we re-run the regressions 
including the lagged dependent variable (Table 5). In turn, in Table 6, we control for country-
year fixed effects to capture the evolution of country-specific fundamentals at an annual 
frequency. As such, this test encompasses all annual variables typically used in standard 
specifications, including a crisis year dummy. The fact that the coefficients are never statistically 
significant provides further indication that, once the crisis is controlled for, default does not exert 
any visible influence on output.
8 
Table 7 explores the pre- and post-default periods in more detail by narrowing the 
estimation window to six-year period centered around the default event. The results are again 
unchanged. Table 8, in turn, explores the role of outliers (of particular relevance given the 
relatively small number of events in our sample) by running the regression of Table 4, column 2 
dropping one country at a time. The table, which highlights extreme values for the coefficients 
and t-statistics, shows that the contemporaneous effect ranges between –1.79 and –2.88 and that 
it is always statistically significant. The effect at T-1 ranges between –2.17 and –3.53 and is 
statistically significant in 13 out of 14 regressions (when we exclude Peru, the p-value is 0.12). 
By contrast, the effect at T+1 ranges between –0.27 and –1.79 and it is never statistically 
significant (we obtain the lowest p value, 0.14, when we exclude Pakistan). Again, leads (but not 
lags) help explain the evolution of output. 
Table 9 presents a different look at the evidence that tests the intuition provided by 
Figure 1: defaults mark the start of the recovery. To do that, we run an event-study like test that 
compares cumulative growth rate before and after the default event for different windows 
centered on the default quarter (which is dropped for the purposes of this computation).
9 In this 
way, we want to confirm not only that output trend declines before the actual default takes place, 
but also that the declining trend is attenuated and even reverts after default. The results strongly 
support this hypothesis: cumulative growth goes from negative to positive, and the difference 
between growth rates before and after increases (Figure 3) to become significant as the window 
widens. Default represents, rather than a trigger, the turning point of the crisis, possibly due to 
                                                       
8 The coefficients should be interpreted here as the deviation form the average growth rate in the year of default, and 
not as the deviation from the average growth rate in normal times. 
9 Specifically, setting t = 0 for the default quarter, DGDP(-s) = [GDP(-1)/GDP(-s)]-1, and  DGDP(+s) = 
[GDP(s)/GDP(+1)]-1.   11
non-trivial costs of avoiding default and to the fact that most of the consequences of default are 
typically reflected in the markets before the decision is made official.   
 
3.2 Growth-Inducing Defaults? 
 
The finding that defaults have been followed by periods of economic recovery should not be 
mistaken as prima facie evidence of causality—much in the same way as the correlation between 
default and annual growth should not be mistaken as saying that defaults are costly. A simple 
inspection of Figure 1 suggests that, to the extent that larger recessions are followed by steeper 
recoveries, the benign post-default outcome may be simply reflecting the association of defaults 
with particularly deep economic downturns.  
Indeed, Beaudry and Koop (1993) have shown that output expansions depend positively 
on the “current depth of recession” (CDR), defined as the gap between current level of output 
and its historical maximum. More generally, a growing body of literature has highlighted the 
nonlinear nature of the business cycle and, in particular, the fact that growth rates depend 
positively on the depth of the current output gap.
10  
We examine whether this argument can explain the finding of “growth-inducing defaults” 
in two steps. First, we document that defaults are indeed associated with larger than average 
recessions (note that so far, we have only documented an association between recessions and 
defaults—more precisely, that the latter are typically preceded by the former—but not that the 
fact that recessions are more pronounced prior to default events). Second, we rerun the baseline 
regressions of Table 4 controlling for the current depth of the recession, captured by Beaudry and 
Koop’s (1993) CDR variable, to see whether the link between defaults and growth is due to the 
omission of the recession depth variable. 
Table 10 reports the results from the first step, showing that the depth of the recession is 
significantly larger for recessions leading to debt defaults. In the table, we first compare the 
maximum recession depth in the absence of default for the whole sample, with the maximum 
CDR reached in recessions that coincided with default events. As the means test indicates, 
recessions are a significant 3 percent deeper during default episodes. The difference is even 
larger when we restrict attention to countries that defaulted at least once in the period under 
                                                       
10 The underlying assumption is that, because of the excess capacity during the contractionary phase of the cycle, 
positive real shocks will have more persistent effects than negative shocks. See also Hamilton (1989), Jansen and Oh 
(1999), and Neftci (2001).   12
study: for defaulters, recessions have been nearly twice as deep when they ended in default than 
otherwise. The same conclusion can be reached by looking at defaulters individually: pre-default 
recessions are always deeper (and often significantly so). 
Table 11, in turn, replicates the baseline regressions of Table 4, including the CDR 
variable to test whether the expansionary effect of defaults can be attributed to the larger depth of 
the preceding recessions. As expected, we find that CDR has a positive and statistical significant 
effect on growth, which is robust to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (which 
replicates Beaudry and Koop’s (1993) specification for the U.S.).
11 More to the point of our test, 
including the CDR variable does not alter our baseline result. First of all, we find that the leading 
effect of the crisis remains virtually unaltered (negative and statistically significant). Second, we 
find that including CDR and explicitly controlling for the effect of excess capacity somewhat 
reduces the post-default recovery documented in Table 4 (for instance, the coefficient at def T+1 
in Reg 2 goes from 1.1 to 0.4), but the coefficients for the post-default dummies remain positive 
and insignificant. All this points out that our previous results were not driven by the fact that we 
were not controlling for differences in the depth of the recession.  
 
3.3 Default and Growth in the Long Run 
 
Default may not have immediate effects on output, but may exert its influence over the long run, 
either through lower investment or reduced access to capital markets.
12 Because of that, the 
analysis in this paper would not be complete without a look at the connection between default 
episodes and the evolution of long run growth.  
We look at this issue in two ways. First, we compare growth rates before and after the 
event with the log linear trend growth. More precisely, we divide the defaults in our sample into 
three groups, according to whether post-default growth was below pre-default growth, above pre-
default growth but below long-term growth, and above long-term growth. Table 12 reports the 
result. As can be seen, whereas growth was stronger after default in 70 percent of the cases (in 
line with our previous findings), it exceeded long-term growth in 50 percent of the cases, 
suggesting that default, on average, does not deteriorate growth prospects.  
                                                       
11 Interestingly, the coefficient for our developing sample is roughly twice as large as the one found for the U.S., 
possibly as a combination of nonlinear output gap effects and deeper recessions. 
12 While the evidence on the effect of default on access to finance as measured by its cost (specifically, the sovereign 
risk premium) is mixed at best (see Borenzstein and Panizza, 2005a), there is evidence that defaults may affect 
access through a reduced volume of funds (Levy Yeyati, 2006).    13
In Table 13, we look at the same issue from a different angle. Exploiting the variability of 
HP-filtered long-term growth, we rerun the baseline regressions in Table 4, replacing the growth 
rate with the long-term growth rate (computed country by country over the full sample period). 
As can be seen, the decline in trend output that characterizes the period surrounding default 
precedes the default event, and it does not appear to elicit an additional negative impact ex-post. 
Thus, there seems to be no negative effect on the long-run output immediately after the default 
event. Indeed, long-run growth appears to increase in the post-default period, as illustrated by 
Figure 4, where we compare average HP-filtered output before and after the event. While the 
difference in trends is not significant (as the one standard deviation intervals indicate), the figure 
further confirms that defaults do not seem to exert a negative effect on output over the long run. 
 
3.4  Default and Unemployment 
 
Many observers would agree that, once income distribution is taken into account, unemployment 
may be a more important—and persistent—determinant of social welfare than output growth 
(Pernice and Sturzenegger, 2004). On the other hand, one would expect unemployment and real 
growth to be closely correlated, so that the conclusions from the previous tests should extend to 
this new variable. We show here that this is indeed the case. 
Table 14 provides a preliminary look at the impact of sovereign defaults on 
unemployment. The table replicates the specifications of Table 7 using unemployment instead of 
real output growth as the dependent variable—that is, including the lagged dependent variable to 
control for unemployment persistence. As before, we find that whatever negative influence 
default may have on unemployment, it materializes before the actual default takes place. In 
particular, the increase in unemployment in the run-up to default (with the highest increase 
leading default by three quarters) reverts in the quarter of default.
13  
                                                       
13 Most of the findings reported here for output growth are also obtained for the case of the unempoyment rate. 
Results are available upon request.   14
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper delivers a simple and sobering message: contrary to what it is typically presumed, 
defaults have not been followed by output contractions. In fact, we find that the opposite seems 
to be the case: the default quarter coincides with the trough of the output contraction and marks 
the start of the economic recovery. This, however, does not appear to reflect a “benign” effect of 
defaults but rather the fact that the latter are typically associated with particularly deep recessions 
and, as a result, particularly steep recoveries. 
This finding has important policy implications for debt management policies—and,   
indirectly, for debt sustainability—that should be clarified. It does not imply that policies that 
lead to default have no cost; on the contrary, the large GDP decline that typically precedes a 
default may reflect in part the anticipation of the default decision. Indeed, it could be argued that, 
if strategic defaults are costly, policymakers would only choose to default when these costs are 
inevitable or have already been paid, hence the absence of observed costs documented in this 
paper.
14 
However, the findings that these costs are largely paid before the default decision is made 
also suggests that policymakers’ effort to further postpone a default that has been widely 
anticipated and priced in by the market may be misguided. More generally, the argument bears 
the question about the optimal timing of default. If the default decision entails a tradeoff between 
the burden of servicing the debt (which grows as the crisis deepens and rollover costs mount), 
and the additional cost of default (which declines as the crisis takes its toll), is the absence of 
observed costs documented here an indication that defaults are often deferred for too long? Are 
politicians willing to have the economy make a suboptimal effort to avoid a default that has 
larger political than welfare costs?
15 Is this agency problem and the associated political cost the 
ultimate reason why countries honor their debts? Certainly fruitful questions for future research. 
                                                       
14 The finding that virtually all defaults appear to be driven by an adverse external context rather than by 
opportunistic behavior in times of bonanza is consistent with this view. 
15 Borensztein and Panizza (2005a) discuss this hypothesis.   15
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
A. Yearly  Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
growth 482  1.675  4.877  -14.568  11.190 
invgdp  460  1.773 0.725 0.329 4.215 
pop  growth 523  1.540 1.019 -3.248 3.390 
sec 415  21.889  10.841  3.800  52.400 
pop  level  523  45.085 43.462  3.060 212.000 
gov  460  0.035 0.095 -0.256 0.700 
civil  495  3.741 1.228 1.000 7.000 
￿tt  474  -0.010 0.158 -2.080 1.067 
openness  484  0.299 0.168 0.052 1.146 
bank2av1 533  0.167  0.373  0  1 
def 533  0.043  0.203  0  1 
 
 
B. Quarterly  Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
growth 2,326  0.723791 5.558707 -27.3833  29.99361 
external   2,298  90.78833 22.97053 13.93941 200.5199 
mkt 
pressure  1,808 0.015815 0.487086 -5.32106  13.66791 
   24
 
 
Table 2: Default Episodes Included in the Sample 
 
Country  Year  Quarter  Default 
1982  1  Default on external bank loans 
Argentina  
2001  4  Default on external bonds/Default on external bank 
loans 
Chile   1983  1  Default on external bank loans 
1982  4  Default on external bank loans  Dominican 
Republic   1999  2  Default on domestic bonds 
Ecuador   1999  3  Default on external bonds 
Indonesia   1998  2  Default on external bank loans 
Mexico   1982  3  Default on external bank loans 
1983  3  Default on external bank loans  Nigeria   1986  3  Default on external bonds 
1997  3  Paris club default  Pakistan   1998  2  Default on external bank loans 
1980  1  Default on external bank loans  Peru   1983  1  Default on external bank loans 
Philippines   1983  4  Default on external bank loans 
1991  4  Default on external bank loans 
1998  3  Default on domestic bonds  Russia 
1998  4  Default on external bonds 
1985  3  Default on external bank loans  South 
Africa  1989  4  Default on external bank loans 
Ukraine  1998  3  Default on domestic bonds/Default on external 
bonds/Default on domestic bonds 
1990  1  Default on external bank loans  Uruguay  2003  2  Default on external bonds 
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Table 3. Growth regressions (yearly data) 
 
  Dependent variable: yearly GDP growth 
  Full sample  Emerging economies 
Independent 
variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6  Reg 7
1  Reg 8  Reg 9  Reg 10  Reg 11
2 
invgdp  1.834  1.784  1.780              
  (7.18)***  (6.99)***  (6.95)***              
pop  growth  -0.452  -0.444  -0.452              
  (3.10)***  (3.00)***  (3.07)***              
sec  -0.015  -0.018  -0.022              
  (0.99)  (1.22)  (1.47)              
pop  level  0.003  0.003  0.003              
  (0.72)  (0.78)  (0.89)              
gov  3.161  3.201  3.086              
  (3.16)***  (3.20)***  (3.08)***              
civil 0.027  0.028  0.029              
  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.27)              
Δtt  -0.331  -0.214  0.911              
  (0.28)  (0.18)  (1.93)*              
openness  5.809  5.993  6.797              
  (3.75)***  (3.87)***  (4.45)***              
bank2av1  -0.979  -0.920  -0.948              
  (4.04)***  (3.81)***  (3.95)***              
def  (T-1)    -2.638 -2.618    -3.013  -3.001    -3.297 -3.410     
    (3.76)***  (3.75)***   (5.34)***  (5.31)***  (2.43)**  (2.54)**     
Def -3.010  -3.207    -3.549  -3.824   -3.343  -3.715    -3.051  -3.505 
  (3.45)***  (3.67)***   (6.56)***  (7.08)***    (3.98)***  (3.56)***  (3.15)***  (2.11)** 
def (T+1)    -0.552  -0.458    -2.212 -2.188    -2.352  -2.348     
    (0.89)  (0.73)   (3.74)***  (3.64)***  (2.05)**  (2.01)**     
Constant  -2.179  -2.061  -2.236  1.604 1.689 1.697 1.724  2.080  2.118  1.814  1.828 
  (2.69)***  (2.53)**  (2.74)*** (26.04)*** (27.11)*** (27.34)*** (21.14)*** (8.90)*** (9.20)*** (8.41)*** (7.37)***
Observations  2,153  2,153  2,114  4,841 4,839 4,763 2,153 454  433  482  287 
Countries 89 89 89 181 181 181  89  28 28 28 14 
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.10  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.10  0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Same sample as in column (1). 
2 Sample used in the quarterly regressions.   26
Table 4. Quarterly Data, Baseline Model 
 
  Dependent variable: seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP growth 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      0.463    
       (0.37)    
def  (T-2)     -1.002  -0.954    
     (1.39)  (1.31)     
def (T-1)    -2.916  -2.900  -2.854     
   (2.17)**  (2.17)**  (2.11)**    
def  -2.802 -2.833 -2.811 -2.763 -2.834 -2.835 
  (2.00)** (2.02)** (2.02)** (1.99)** (2.01)** (2.01)** 
def (T+1)    1.142  1.161  1.208     
   (0.80)  (0.80)  (0.83)    
def  (T+2)     1.017  1.066    
     (1.01)  (1.05)     
def  (T+3)      -0.369    
       (0.23)    
def (T-1… T-2)          -1.970   
       (2.47)**   
def  (T+2…  T+1)       1.067   
       (1.21)   
def (T-1… T-3)            -1.183 
        (1.65)* 
def  (T+3…  T+1)        0.562 
        (0.69) 
mkt pressure  -0.833  -0.822  -0.776 -0.766 -0.821 -0.823 
  (3.98)*** (3.94)*** (3.85)*** (3.82)*** (3.94)*** (3.95)*** 
Constant  0.858 0.862 0.896 0.884 0.862 0.863 
  (6.48)*** (6.41)*** (6.53)*** (6.24)*** (6.33)*** (6.27)*** 
Observations 1,745  1,729 1,688 1,644 1,729 1,729 
R-squared 0.01  0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -3.902  -3.345    
     [0.012]  [0.105]     
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      2.178  1.905    
     [0.225]  [0.437]     
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     -4.058 -6.080 -5.250 -3.037 -1.745 
    [0.036] [0.008] [0.084] [0.008] [0.091] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets.   27
Table 5 Robustness I. Controlling for Lagged Growth 
 
  Dependent variable: seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP growth 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      0.328    
      (0.28)    
def  (T-2)     -0.936  -0.874    
     (1.18)  (1.07)    
def  (T-1)    -3.216 -3.189 -3.156     
    (2.52)** (2.48)** (2.45)**     
def  -3.560 -3.611 -3.583 -3.587 -3.603 -3.602 
  (2.44)** (2.46)** (2.43)** (2.43)** (2.45)** (2.45)** 
def  (T+1)    0.409 0.436 0.435     
    (0.29) (0.31) (0.31)     
def  (T+2)     1.248  1.325    
     (1.24)  (1.30)    
def  (T+3)      -0.123    
      (0.08)    
def  (T-1…  T-2)       -2.083   
       (2.61)***   
def  (T+2…  T+1)       0.821   
       (0.95)   
def  (T-1…  T-3)        -1.301 
        (1.85)* 
def  (T+3…  T+1)        0.474 
        ( 0 . 6 0 )  
mkt pressure  -0.823  -0.801  -0.798 -0.784 -0.803 -0.806 
  (3.56)*** (3.52)*** (3.51)*** (3.43)*** (3.52)*** (3.53)*** 
dep var. (-1)  -0.244  -0.244  -0.244 -0.264 -0.244 -0.244 
  (6.58)*** (6.53)*** (6.49)*** (7.09)*** (6.52)*** (6.53)*** 
Constant  1.145 1.161 1.160 1.172 1.158 1.158 
  (8.66)*** (8.63)*** (8.44)*** (8.33)*** (8.51)*** (8.44)*** 
Observations 1,703  1,687 1,663 1,619 1,687 1,687 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -4.125  -3.702    
     [0.008]  [0.067]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      1.684  1.637    
     [0.331]  [0.489]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     -3.625 -5.809 -5.339 -2.904 -1.775 
    [0.052] [0.010] [0.071] [0.011] [0.077] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets.   28
Table 6. Robustness II. Controlling for Country-Year Effects 
 
  Dependent variable: seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP growth 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      1.681    
      (0.85)    
def  (T-2)     -0.136  0.637    
     (0.08)  (0.29)    
def  (T-1)    -2.455 -2.204 -1.457     
   (1.74)*  (1.28)  (0.71)     
def  -2.401 -2.805 -2.467 -1.797 -2.321 -1.643 
  (1.54)  (1.70)*  (1.27) (0.81) (1.20) (0.77) 
def  (T+1)    1.388 1.869 2.228     
    (0.74) (0.93) (1.04)     
def  (T+2)     1.611  1.789    
     (1.21)  (1.26)    
def  (T+3)      -0.154    
      (0.08)    
def  (T-1…  T-2)       -1.099   
       (0.73)   
def  (T+2…  T+1)       1.888   
       (1.45)   
def  (T-1…  T-3)        0.245 
        ( 0 . 1 4 )  
def  (T+3…  T+1)        1.589 
        ( 1 . 2 7 )  
mkt pressure  -0.668  -0.660  -0.627 -0.627 -0.671 -0.677 
  (2.26)** (2.22)** (2.10)** (2.09)** (2.26)** (2.28)** 
Constant  0.852 0.853 0.867 0.821 0.828 0.791 
  (5.84)*** (5.77)*** (5.46)*** (4.64)*** (5.30)*** (4.70)*** 
Observations 1,745  1,729 1,688 1,644 1,729 1,729 
R-squared 0.12  0.12  0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -2.340  0.861    
     [0.432]  [0.875]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      3.480  3.863    
     [0.196]  [0.344]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     -3.843 -5.820 -3.002 -2.987 -1.344 
    [0.079] [0.054] [0.545] [0.054] [0.392] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets.   29
Table 7. Robustness III. Restricting the Estimation to a 3+3 Years Window 
 
  Dependent variable: seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP growth 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      0.696    
      (0.53)    
def  (T-2)     -0.816  -0.725    
     (1.09)  (0.95)    
def  (T-1)    -2.734 -2.723 -2.632     
   (2.03)**  (2.04)**  (1.95)*     
def  -2.606 -2.641 -2.622 -2.531 -2.628 -2.613 
  (1.81)* (1.82)* (1.83)* (1.76)* (1.81)* (1.80)* 
def  (T+1)    1.329 1.344 1.435     
    (0.89) (0.87) (0.92)     
def  (T+2)     1.212  1.303    
     (1.21)  (1.29)    
def  (T+3)      -0.128    
      (0.08)    
def  (T-1…  T-2)       -1.770   
       (2.17)**   
def  (T+2…  T+1)       1.272   
       (1.38)   
def  (T-1…  T-3)        -0.965 
        ( 1 . 3 0 )  
def  (T+3…  T+1)        0.786 
        ( 0 . 9 4 )  
mkt pressure  -0.763  -0.741  -0.680 -0.684 -0.742 -0.747 
  (4.48)*** (4.42)*** (4.33)*** (4.36)*** (4.45)*** (4.48)*** 
Constant  0.536 0.563 0.553 0.489 0.552 0.539 
  (2.43)** (2.46)** (2.23)**  (1.83)*  (2.26)** (2.11)** 
Observations  521 520 508 496 520 520 
R-squared 0.04  0.05  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -3.539  -2.661    
     [0.027]  [0.221]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      2.556  2.610    
     [0.176]  [0.307]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     -4.063 -6.095 -5.271 -3.042 -1.751 
    [0.040] [0.009] [0.086] [0.009] [0.093] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets. 
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Table 8. Robustness IV. Dropping One Country at a Time 
 
Dropping  Contemporaneous effect  T+1  T-1 
  Coefficient |t-statistics| Coefficient |t-statistics| Coefficient  |t-statistics| 
  -2.37 2.18 -1.02 0.75 -3.09  2.13 
Argentina  -2.31 2.10 -0.34 0.23 -2.81  1.79 
Chile  -2.71 2.64 -1.22 0.83 -2.64  1.83 
Dominican  Republic  -2.35 2.15 -1.21 0.82 -3.45  2.38 
Ecuador  -2.37 2.16 -1.02 0.68 -2.98  1.98 
Indonesia  -1.87 1.88 -0.86 0.58 -2.93  1.95 
Mexico  -2.37 2.16 -0.87 0.59 -2.96  1.97 
Nigeria  -2.01 1.78 -0.27 0.19 -3.53  2.67 
Pakistan  -1.79 1.92 -1.79 1.45 -3.04  2.03 
Peru  -2.55 2.23 -1.11 0.72 -2.17  1.57 
Philippines  -2.03 1.93 -1.49 1.07 -2.80  1.88 
Russia  -2.77 2.50 -0.89 0.66 -3.23  2.10 
South  Africa  -2.41 2.08 -1.16 0.74 -3.23  2.03 
Ukraine  -2.30 2.10 -0.75 0.51 -3.52  2.47 
Uruguay  -2.88 2.65 -0.83 0.53 -3.51  2.30 
Notes: Specification (2) of Table 4.  






Table 9. Cumulative Output Growth before and after Default 
 
Change in Growth  Obs  Mean  DGP(-T)-DGP(+T)  p-value 
DGP(-T)-DGP(+T)<0 
DGDP(-2) 14  -1.35 
DGDP(+2) 14  1.36 
-2.71 0.0766 
DGDP(-3) 14  -2.77 
DGDP(+3) 14  0.38 
-3.15 0.0797 
DGDP(-4) 13  -1.69 
DGDP(+4) 14  -0.06 
-1.63 0.2804 
DGDP(-5) 12  -2.41 
DGDP(+5) 14  1.71 
-4.13 0.0997 
DGDP(-6) 12  -4.69 
DGDP(+6) 13  5.36 
-10.04 0.0037 
Notes: The table reports and compares the average cumulative growth rate before and after the default event, for windows of increasing length. For a window of 
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Table 10. Maximum Depth of the Recession and Default 
 
p-value 







no default  625  0.0578  Full sample 
default 20  0.1079 
0.0015 0.0030 0.9985 
no default  309  0.0511  Countries having at 
least one default  default 20  0.1079 
0.0007 0.0014 0.9993 
no default  31  0.0452  Argentina 
default 2  0.1330 
0.0017 0.0034 0.9983 
no default  31  0.0614 
Nigeria 
default 2  0.1340 
0.0697 0.1394 0.9303 
no default  23  0.0567 
Peru 
default 2  0.0316 
0.6649 0.6702 0.3351 
no default  11  0.0641 
Russia 
default 2  0.1828 
0.0260 0.0521 0.9740 
no default  19  0.0322 
Uruguay 
default 2  0.0200 
0.6885 0.6230 0.3115 
no default  27  0.0140 
South Africa 
default 2  0.0208 
0.2348 0.4696 0.7652 
Notes: CDR is defined as cumulated drop since last peak, measured as CDRt = max{yt-s}s=0,…,t – yt , where yt represents log of 
GDP, and s represents the periods since last peak.  
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Table 11. Current Depth of the Recession and Growth after Default 
 
  Dependent variable: seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP growth 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      0.253    
      (0.20)    
def  (T-2)     -1.072  -1.034    
     (1.23)  (1.15)    
def  (T-1)    -3.263 -3.236 -3.223     
    (2.32)** (2.30)** (2.26)**     
def  -3.435 -3.491 -3.451 -3.463 -3.501 -3.510 
  (2.70)*** (2.72)*** (2.73)*** (2.75)*** (2.73)*** (2.73)*** 
def  (T+1)    0.409 0.448 0.428     
    (0.29) (0.31) (0.29)     
def  (T+2)     0.579  0.586    
     (0.55)  (0.55)    
def  (T+3)      -0.424    
      (0.29)    
def  (T-1…  T-2)       -2.192   
       (2.53)**   
def  (T+2…  T+1)       0.465   
       (0.52)   
def  (T-1…  T-3)        -1.408 
        (1.87)* 
def  (T+3…  T+1)        0.132 
        ( 0 . 1 7 )  
mkt pressure  -0.885  -0.865  -0.820 -0.810 -0.863 -0.866 
  (3.86)*** (3.83)*** (3.76)*** (3.70)*** (3.82)*** (3.83)*** 
CDR  (-1)  0.209 0.211 0.206 0.224 0.210 0.210 
  (5.04)*** (5.08)*** (4.93)*** (5.41)*** (5.05)*** (5.07)*** 
Constant  0.377 0.386 0.425 0.375 0.393 0.394 
  (2.34)** (2.37)** (2.57)** (2.22)** (2.40)** (2.40)** 
Observations 1,744  1,728 1,687 1,643 1,728 1,728 
R-squared 0.04  0.05  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -4.308  -4.004    
     [0.011]  [0.067]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      1.027  0.590    
     [0.572]  [0.804]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     -3.672 -5.335 -4.594 -2.657 -1.540 
    [0.065] [0.027] [0.135] [0.028] [0.138] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets. .  34
Table 12. Default and Long-Run Growth 
 
Group 1 
wbcode cyname  year  quarter 
MEX Mexico 1982  3 
PAK Pakistan 1998  2 
PER Peru 1980  1 
PHL Philippines 1983  4 
RUS Russia 1991  4 
ZAF South  Africa 1989  4 
Notes: Group 1 are default episodes where growth in the four periods 
after the default was below growth in the four periods before the default 




wbcode cyname  year  quarter 
DOM  Dominican 
Republic  1982 4 
IDN Indonesia 1998  2 
NGA Nigeria 1983  3 
ZAF South  Africa 1985  3 
Notes: Group 2 contains all episodes in where growth in the four periods 
after the default was higher than growth in the four periods before the 
default but below long-run growth (so if default is at time t, this group 
contains all observations where LRGR>(GDP(t+5)-
GDP(t+1))/GDP(t+1)>GDP(t-1)-GDP(t-5))/GDP(t-5)). Where long run 
growth (LRGR) is annual growth computed over the whole sample. 
 
Group 3 
wbcode cyname  year  quarter 
ARG Argentina 1982  1 
ARG Argentina 2001  4 
CHL Chile 1983  1 
ECU Ecuador 1999  3 
NGA Nigeria 1986  3 
PER Peru 1983  1 
RUS Russia 1998  4 
UKR Ukraine 1998  3 
URY Uruguay 1990  1 
URY Uruguay 2003  2 
Notes: Group 3 contains all episodes in where growth in the four periods 
after the default was higher than growth in the four periods before the 
default and also higher long-run growth (so if default is at time t, this 
group contains all observations where LRGR<(GDP(t+5)-
GDP(t+1))/GDP(t+1)>GDP(t-1)-GDP(t-5))/GDP(t-5)). Where long run 
growth (LRGR) is annual growth computed over the whole sample. 
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                        Table 13. Long-Run Growth Regressions 
 
  Dependent variable: HP filtered quarterly GDP growth 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      -0.378    
      (2.34)**    
def  (T-2)     -0.337  -0.348    
     (2.07)**  (2.13)**    
def  (T-1)    -0.284 -0.295 -0.307     
    (1.70)* (1.76)* (1.82)*     
def  -0.256 -0.264 -0.275 -0.286 -0.276 -0.289 
  (1.48) (1.52) (1.57) (1.62) (1.60)  (1.68)* 
def  (T+1)    -0.214 -0.225 -0.237     
    (1.20) (1.25) (1.31)     
def  (T+2)     -0.196  -0.207    
     (1.07)  (1.12)    
def  (T+3)      -0.167    
      (0.87)    
def  (T-1…  T-2)       -0.317   
       (2.66)***   
def  (T+2…  T+1)       -0.212   
       (1.64)   
def  (T-1…  T-3)        -0.347 
        (3.50)*** 
def  (T+3…  T+1)        -0.207 
        (1.89)* 
mkt pressure  -0.138  -0.134  -0.123 -0.119 -0.132 -0.130 
  (2.48)** (2.48)** (2.47)** (2.46)** (2.48)** (2.49)** 
Constant  0.773 0.779 0.785 0.792 0.783 0.788 
  (50.69)*** (50.03)*** (49.06)*** (48.05)*** (49.21)*** (48.34)*** 
Observations 1,769  1,752 1,710 1,666 1,752 1,752 
R-squared 0.39  0.40  0.41 0.42 0.40 0.40 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -0.632  -1.033    
     [0.009]  [0.001]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      -0.421  -0.611    
     [0.108]  [0.069]    
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     -0.070 -0.211 -0.422 -0.105 -0.140 
    [0.770] [0.532] [0.313] [0.530] [0.306] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets. 
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Table 14. Default and Unemployment 
 
  Dependent variable: seasonally adjusted quarterly unemployment rate 
Independent variables  Reg 1  Reg 2  Reg 3  Reg 4  Reg 5  Reg 6 
def  (T-3)      0.058    
       (1.00)    
def (T-2)      -0.068  -0.073     
     (1.32)  (1.37)     
def  (T-1)   0.070  0.064  0.060    
   (0.69)  (0.63)  (0.60)    
def  -0.112 -0.113 -0.119 -0.122 -0.120 -0.127 
  (2.86)***  (2.72)***  (2.70)*** (2.51)** (2.81)***  (2.71)*** 
def  (T+1)   -0.111  -0.118  -0.122    
   (5.20)***  (4.89)***  (4.41)***    
def (T+2)      -0.041  -0.046     
     (0.42)  (0.46)     
def  (T+3)      -0.107    
      (1.68)*    
def (T-1… T-2)          -0.003   
         (0.04)   
def (T+2… T+1)          -0.079   
         (1.43)   
def (T-1… T-3)            0.003 
        (0.04) 
def  (T+3…  T+1)        -0.095 
        (2.19)** 
mkt pressure  0.102  0.098 0.098 0.095 0.102 0.102 
  (2.50)** (2.38)** (2.39)** (2.17)** (2.51)** (2.43)** 
Constant  0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 
  (2.49)**  (2.48)**  (2.56)** (2.62)*** (2.58)** (2.68)*** 
Observations  457 457 457 457 457 457 
R-squared 0.05  0.06  0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 
∑ −
1 ) ( i T def      -0.004  0.045    
     [0.968]  [0.765]     
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def      -0.159  -0.275    
     [0.139]  [0.037]     
∑ +
1 ) ( i T def =∑ −
1 ) ( i T def     0.181 0.155 0.320 0.076 0.098 
    [0.069] [0.289] [0.059] [0.355] [0.152] 
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. P-value of F-tests in brackets. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variable Definition and Sources 
 
Yearly variables 
Variable Definition  Source 
growth  GDP per capita growth (annual %)  World Development Indicators 
invgdp  Investment share of CGDP (current prices)  World Development Indicators 
 
pop growth  Population growth rate  World Development Indicators 
sec  Percentage of secondary school attained in the total pop Barro and Lee (2000). 
pop level  Total population  World Development Indicators 
gov  One period lag of general government final 
consumption expenditure (annual % growth)  World Development Indicators 
civil  Index of Civil Rights  Freedom in The World 
Δtt  Terms of trade (tt) variation, computed as tt-tt(-1)  World Development Indicators 
openness  Average exports plus imports to GDP (current US$)  World Development Indicators 
bank2av1  Bank Crisis Measure (binary, 1 = crisis)  Caprio and Kinglebiel (2003) 
def  Beginning of Foreign Currency Bank and Bond Debt 
Default  Standard & Poor’s 
def (+1)  Forward of def   




Variable Definition  Source 
growth 
Real seasonally adjusted GDP growth (% change). In 
order to seasonally adjust the real GDP series, we 
proceed in the following way. First, we calculate the 
mean of real GDP by country. Next, we obtained the 
residuals of a regression of real GDP on quarterly 
dummies. Finally, we added the residuals to mean 
growth series. We dropped observations where the 
absolute value of quarterly GDP growth was greater 
than 30 percent.  
 
International Financial Statistics 
and national sources 
def  Beginning of Foreign Currency Bank and Bond Debt 
Default 
Global Development Finance 2003 
(Analysis and Statistical Appendix) 
and Standard & Poor’s 
x (-i)  i
th lag of variable x  
x (+i)  i
th lead of variable x  
External  Index of external factors   
mkt pressure 
High-frequency market pressure index (reserves + 
depreciation weigthed by the inverse of their standard 
deviation) 
International Financial Statistics 
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Table A2. List of Countries and Years Included in the Quarterly Analysis 
 
Country  Years and quarters 
Algeria  From 1995:2 to 2005:1 
Argentina  From 1970:2 to 2005:4 
Bangladesh  From 2000:2 to 2004:4 
Barbados  From 2000:2 to 2005:3 
Brazil  From 1991:2 to 2002:4 
Bulgaria  From 2000:2 to 2005:3 
Chile  From 1980:2 to 2002:4 
Colombia  From 1994:2 to 2002:4 
Cote D’ Ivoire  From 2000:2 to 2003:4 
Croatia  From 1991:2 to 2005:3 
Cyprus  From 2000:2 to 2005:3 
Dominican Republic  From 1980:2 to 2002:4 
Ecuador  From 1991:2 to 2002:4 
Fiji  From 2000:2 to 2002:4 
Hungary  From 1979:2 to 2005:3 
India  From 2000:2 to 2005:3 
Indonesia  From 1993:2 to 2002:4 
Korea  From 1970:2 to 2005:3 
Luxembourg  From 2000:2 to 2005:3 
Macedonia, FYR  From 2000:2 to 2004:4 
Malawi  From 2000:2 to 2004:2 
Malaysia  From 1970:2 to 2005:3 
Mexico  From 1970:2 to 2005:3 
Morocco  From 1993:2 to 2002:4 
Nigeria  From 1970:2 to 2005:3 
Pakistan  From 1995:3 to 2002:2 
Peru  From 1979:2 to 2002:4 
Philippines  From 1981:2 to 2005:2 
Poland  From 1982:2 to 2005:3 
Russia  From 1991:2 to 2002:4 
Senegal  From 2000:4 to 2003:4 
South Africa  From 1970:2 to 2002:4 
Thailand  From 1993:2 to 2002:4 
Trinidad y Tobago  From 2000:2 to 2004:4 
Tunisia  From 1970:2 to 2005:3 
Turkey  From 1980:2 to 2005:3 
Ukraine  From 1993:2 to 2002:4 
Uruguay  From 1988:2 to 2004:4 
Venezuela  From 1993:2 to 2002:4 
 
 